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Abstract 
The Philippine government through the Central Bank has tried to influence 
the rural banks' allocation of funds in favor of small farmer loans through 
changes in regulatory policy. A linear programming model was developed to 
evaluate changes in the small farm loan portfolio resulting from selected 
regulatory changes. Results indicate that neither seed funds to support super-
vised credit programs nor preferential interest rates on rediscount funds for 
agricultural loans increase the flow of credit to small farmers. Such policies 
discourage banks from mobilizing local deposits and increase their dependence 
on Central Bank rediscount funds. A comprehensive rural financial market re-
form that eliminates negative real rates of interest and promotes the finan-
cinl independenc~ of rural banks is needed to increase the flow of credit to 
small farmers. 
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Introduction 
An increase in the supply of institutional credit to the agricultural 
sector, particularly the food sector which is dominated by the small farmers, 
has been one of the policy instruments adopted by The Philippine government 
during the last two and a half decades to achieve the twin goals of increased 
agricultural productivity and equitable income distribution. The most well 
known of these programs is the Masagana 99 (M99) program launched in 1973 to 
achieve self-sufficiency in rice production. M99 integrated under one 
umbrella low cost production credit as a vehicle for income transfers to small 
rice farmers, a fertilizer subsidy, price support, technical assistance and 
other agricultural support services (Esguerra]. In addition, the government, 
through the Central Bank (CB), initiated the development of the rural banking 
system. The CB provided tremendous technical and financial support to ensure 
the viability and success of the rural banks. At the same time, it has tried 
to influence the rural banks' allocation of funds in favor of small farmer 
loans through changes in the regulatory policies. No previous study has been 
conducted to analyze the effects of those policies on the allocative behavior 
of banks. 
The objectives of the present study are: (1) to determine the profit-
maximizing level of small farm loans of a rural bank, given the available 
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alternative assets, internal operating constraints, regulatory policies of the 
CB and other external constraints, and (2) to evaluate the changes in the 
small farm loan portfolio of the bank resulting from changes in selected regu-
latory policies. 
The Analytical Approach of the Study 
Linear programming (LP) is the analytical approach employed to achieve 
the objectives of this study. The assumption of profit maximization for the 
bank and the linearity of all the constraints facing the bank suggest the 
suitability of the LP technique for the present study. 
A multi-period model is developed in this study. More than one period is 
included to avoid sub-optimal decisions which might result from a myopic view 
that ignores the relevant aspects of the future. The bank is assumed to have 
a one-year planning horizon that is partitioned into twelve monthly planning 
periods. The choice of the monthly planning periods was dictated in large 
part by the fact that rural banks are required by the CB to submit monthly 
financial statements used to determine the banks' compliance with the regula-
tory constraints imposed on them. 
The general form of the LP model estimated in this study is presented 
below: 
subject to: ~ (A - L ) < a 
-kt i,t j,t - pkt 
where ~ = Expected net profit during the planning horizon. 
ri = expected net return on asset i. 
cj = expected cost of liability j. 
Ai,t' Lj ts average stock of asset 1 and liability j, respectively, 
' during period t. 
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Rkt = coefficient matrix for individual asset and liability 
accounts associated with constraints K at time t. 
(K = l, ••••• n; n =number of constraints). 
~kt vector of stipulations associated with constraints k 
at time t. 
FCt = fixed costs at time t. 
As formulated above, the maximization of the monthly flows of net profit 
or income is the objective function used in the model. This is equivalent to 
the maximization of the return on stockholders' equity (ROE) at the start of 
the planning period since it is assumed that there is no capital expansion 
through the sale of new shares of stock; i.e., reinvestment of profits is the 
only source of additional capital in the model. 
As Cohen and Hammer report, there are alternative choices for con-
sideration in the specification of the objective function to use in a bank 
behavior model: 1) maximize the value of the stockholder's equity during the 
final period of the planning horizon; 2) maximize the present value of the net 
income stream plus realized capital gains (and losses) during the planning 
horizon; and 3) maximize the present values of the net income stream plus 
realized capital gains (and losses) during the planning horizon plus the pre-
sent value of the stockholders' equity during the final period of the planning 
horizon. Obviously, these choices are more appropriate for banks whose capi-
tal stocks are being traded in the stock market, as in the case of large 
commercial banks. This is not the case, however, for rural banks in The 
Philippines. These banks are closely held'corporations and although the sale 
of new stocks and stock transfers is allowed, these transactions are regulated 
by the CB. In practice, a majority of the stock transfers and new stock sales 
are transacted among the existing stockholders and their families. 
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In contrast to the above specifications of the objective function which 
are in terms of present value, the objective function for the rural banks in 
our model is in terms of current value to avoid the difficulties associated 
with choosing the proper discount rate; except in the case of medium and long-
term loans which account for a very small share of Philippine rural bank loan 
portfolios, all the asset activities in the model have maturities of less than 
one year. Also, interest income is assumed to be deducted in advance for all 
loans. Hence, the problem introduced by not using present value originates 
mainly from the differences in the monthly repayment flows among the loan 
variables. 
The Constraints in the LP Model 
The profit-maximizing goal of the bank is restricted by three categories 
of constraints; those imposed on it by the regulatory authorities, the 
regulatory constraints; those which are related to the market, the market 
constraint; and a funds-availability constraint used merely to specify that 
total uses of funds equal total funds available. 
Regulatory Constraints!! 
1. Reserve Requirement. The required reserve is 14 percent on demand 
deposits and 8 percent on time and savings deposits. At least 10 percent of 
the total required reserves shall be in the form of cash deposited with the 
CB. The balance of the required reserves may be held in the form of vault 
cash and/or CB-supported securities. However, the holding of securities eli-
gible as reserves cannot exceed 18 percent of the total required reserves (or 
20 percent of the maximum 90 percent allowable reserves held in the form of 
CB-supported securities and/or cash in vault). 
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2. Risk-Asset Ratio. By regulation, a rural bank must maintain a risk-
asset ratio of not less than 10 percent. This ratio is computed by dividing 
total assets less risk-free assets by capital funds. Risk free assets include 
cash on hand and due from banks, CB-supported securities, loans secured by 
deposits, bank premises, furniture, fixtures and equipment and supervised 
credit loans covered by guarantee. 
3. Operating Capital Ratio. The bank's operating capital must be less 
than 50 percent of the paid-up common capital stock or 40 percent of total 
deposit liabilities (exclusive of special deposits) whichever is higher. 
4. Past-Due Loan Ratio. The ratio of past-due loans to the total loans 
outstanding of the bank cannot exceed 25 percent if the bank is to avail 
itself of the special rediscounting privilege with the CB as well as other 
privileges. Excluded from past-due computation are loans covered by guarantee 
and M-99 loans in litigation (since M-99 loans are most likely to be covered 
by guarantee, guaranteed loans must be excluded to avoid double counting). 
5. Rediscounting Constraint. There is a ceiling on the amount of loans 
that rural banks can rediscount with the CB. The ceiling depends on whether 
the loans are supervised or not. For supervised loans, the rediscounting 
limit is 400 percent of net worth plus 100 percent of monthly average savings 
and time deposits (STD) during the three months immediately preceding the date 
of rediscount application. The corresponding figures for non-supervised loans 
are 200 percent of net worth plus 50 percent of monthly average STD. All of 
the outstanding balance on supervised loan papers can be rediscounted with the 
CB, but only 80 percent on loans that are not supervised can be discounted. 
Only loans with original maturities of less than one year are rediscountable. 
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Market Constraints 
1. Loans. In the model it is assumed that the bank will not lend more 
than is forecast in any loan category during any period. This implies that 
banks are passive rather than active market participants openly seeking 
borrowers. In the context of the rural financial market in The Philippines 
where excess loan demand is generally assumed because of low, even negative, 
real rates of interest on loans, this passive attitude of the banks seems 
logical. There is no need for banks to compete for loans in general. 
However, for certain loans, specifically those with low default risks, some 
degree of competition may be present depending on the structure of the market. 
Therefore, the forecast should be linked to a certain level of loan risk. 
Beyond this forecast, the bank is restricted by risk considerations from 
further lending and hence, will simply say "no" to particular loan requests or 
otherwise assume a passive attitude towards the market. There is a real need 
to specify the market limits on loans in the model. Since it is likely that 
net rates of return among types of loans would differ, the model operates such 
that, ceteris paribus, all the available funds will be channeled into loans 
offering the highest return. 
2. Investments. Except for equity investments, there are no market 
constraints on the amount of new investments a bank can make during each 
period. It is assumed that the supply of government securities and money 
market instruments is infinitely elastic. Equity investments are regulated 
very strictly by the CB and for our purposes they can be assumed to be zero. 
Of course, the reduction or sale of investment assets is constrained by the 
initial amount available. 
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3. Deposit Variables. As in the case of loans the increase in deposit 
variables is limited to the forecast levels during the period. The variable~ 
are measured in terms of net monthly balance so there is no need to include 
another set of variables to represent withdrawals, new accounts, interest cre-
dits, et cetera, in the model. 
Intertemporal relationships are of prime importance in a multi-period 
model since they express the interdependence of variables over time. This is 
particularly true with respect to the maturity of the accounts, and hence, the 
associated liquidity flows. In addition to maturity flows, an autonomous flow 
variable is associated with each account at each time period. When the flow 
is positive, the account is accumulating when the flow is negative, the 
account is being depleted. 
Asset and liability flows are assumed to take place at constant rates 
during the period. Under this assumption, purchases, sales, and maturations 
of assets are presumed to occur at constant rates during the period and hence 
the rate of change in the stocks of the balance sheet accounts themselves 
will be constant over time. The advantage of this assumption is that the 
average stock of an account during a period can be defined simply as the 
arithmetic mean of the initial balance and the end-of-period balance. 
Default risks on each loan are assumed to be independent, and default 
risks across types of loans are also assumed independent. Default risk on the 
bank's investment portfolio, primarily national government bonds and Central 
Bank Certificates of Indebtedness, is assumed to be zero. 
Determination and Selection of Sample Banks 
This study was limited to banks operating in the Central Luzon region of 
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The Philippines. A large proportion of the small farmers in the country are 
located in this region, and it has been a hot bed of social and political 
unrest in the country. The economic plight of the small farmers in this 
region has consistently been accorded top priority in the government's agri-
cultural development programs. Since the analytical thrust of the study is 
the identification of changes in CB policies needed to influence rural bank 
credit allocation in favor of the small farmers, the choice of this region as 
the study area is logical. 
A sample of fifteen banks was included in the study. This constitutes 
over 10 percent of the rural bank population in the region (exclusive of those 
banks three years old and less). It is difficult to establish just how repre-
sentative the sample of banks is of the population considered in the study. 
Certain elements of non-randomness may have been present in selecting the 
individual sample banks. Because of the confidentiality of bank information, 
the identification of sample banks was left entirely to the CB Agricultural 
Credit Supervisors (ACS) assigned to the region. 
After distributing the 15 banks among the six provinces in the region, 
more or less in proportion to the number of rural banks operating for more 
than three years, the ACS were requested to identify randomly the banks to be 
included in the sample. One condition made in the sample selection was that 
the selected banks should have assets which are no more than P30 million nor 
less than P4 million to prevent extremely small and large banks from intro-
ducing significant bias in the sample.~ Data needed for the LP model were 
gathered through the use of a structured and pretested questionnaire. 
In terms of total assets, the average size of the 15 sample banks covered 
in the study was P10,404,207 as of October 31, 1979 (Table 1). The size 
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Table 1: The Average Balance Sheet Characteristics of the Fifteen 
Sample Rural Banks as of October 31, 1979, Central Luzon, 
The Philippines 
Assets 
Cash and Due from Banks: 
Cash on Hand (CH0 )~/ 
Due from CB (CCB0 ) 
Due from other banks (COB0 ) 
Loans and Discounts 
Small-supervised agriculture loan (SSL0) 
Small-ordinary agriculture loan (SOLo) 
Large-supervised agriculture loan (LSLo) 
Large-ordinary agriculture loan (LOAL0) 
Medium-and-long-term agriculture loan (MLLo) 
Commercial loan (COMLo) 
Industrial loan (INLo) 
Other loan (OLo) 
Less: Allowance for probable losses 
Net Loans and Discounts 
Investments: 
CB Certificate of Indebtedness -
reserve eligible (ERES0) 
non-reserve eligible (XRESo) 
Preferred stock redemption (PSRo) 
Agrarian Reform Credits (ARC0) 
Other Assets: 
Bank premises (BPREM) 
Furniture, fixtures and equipment (FFE) 
Other bank assets (OBA) 
TOTAL ASSETS 
Liabilities 
Reserve Deposits: 
Demand deposits (DDo) 
Savings deposits (SDo) 
Time deposits (TD0) 
Non-Reserve Deposits: 
Special time deposits (STD0) 
Barrio Guarantee Fund (BGFo) 
Barrio Savings Fund (BSFo) 
Special Savings Deposits (SSDCo) 
p 106,424 
98,996 
687,534 
892,955 
2,015,608 
1,038,108 
2,511,297 
1,887,502 
370,596 
524,392 
249,107 
164,933 
(238,455) 
8,523,090 
56,486 
89,527 
8,110 
35,881 
156,265 
79,990 
Pl0,404,207 
7,748 
2,327,666 
1,581,454 
712,294 
21,715 
78,769 
95,269 
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Table 1 continued 
Liabilities 
Bills Payable: 
Rediscountingsupervised (REDSo) 
Rediscounting-ordinary (REDOo) 
CB-IBRD (IBRDo) 
Other Bills Payable (OBIL)E/ 
Other Liabilities (OLIAB0) 
Capital Accounts (CAPo) 
TOTAL LIABILITIE~/ 
Source: Vergara 
2,783,228 
570,499 
361,832 
71,018 
620,921 
1,171,787 
Pl0,404,207 
~/ The subscript of zero (0) indicates that the figure opposite the balance 
sheet variable serves as the initial values of these variables during the 
first programming period. 
b/ Restructured borrowings from the CB. 
c/ The exchange rate in October of 1979 was about P9.50 per u.s. dollar. 
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varies from P4,194,084 to P22,108,270 and the banks are distributed with eight 
banks above the average and seven below it. The average sample bank has 84 
percent of its total assets in the loan portfolio, 89 percent of which is 
agricultural credit. Deposit liabilities constitute 38 percent of the total 
liabilities (including capital) of the average sample bank. Borrowings from 
the CB account for 36 percent of the total liabilities and almost 89 percent 
of which is in the form of rediscounting. The total capital accounts of the 
average sample bank stood at P1,171,787 about 11 percent of total assets. 
More than 45 percent of the capital is in common stocks and almost 52 percent 
is in undivided profits and surplus accounts. Preferred stocks account for 
the balance. 
Table 2 shows the expected net returns on assets and the total cost of 
liabilities of the sample rural banks, including the estimated administrative 
costs and the risk of default losses of different classes of assets and liabi-
lities. As expected, small supervised agricultural loans (SSL) have the 
highest administrative costs, 1.56 percent, followed closely by small ordinary 
agricultural loans (SOL), 1.54 percent. Large supervised (LSL) and large 
ordinary agricultural loans (LOAL) involve much less administrative costs, 
0.98 percent and 0.96 percent, respectively. Medium and long-term agri-
cultural loans (MLL) have the highest estimated of default risk, 4.3 percent, 
followed by SSL with 3.3 percent. 
Results 
The LP bank model was solved using the average balance sheet conditions 
of the sample banks as of October 31, 1979. Three versions of the basic model 
were also solved to evaluate the impact of changes in the regulatory policies. 
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Table 2: The Expected Net Returns on Assets and the Total Costs 
of Liabilities of the Sample Rural Banks, Central Luzon, 
The Philippines, November 1979 - October 1980 
Nominal Service Administrative Risk of Net Return~/ 
Return Charge Costs Default Loss (Total Cost) Ite~ (1) (2) (3) (4) ( 5) 
------ - Percent per annum - - - -
Assets 
SSL 10.71 z.oo 1.56 3.32 7.83 
LSL 10.71 z.oo .98 2.85 8.88 
SOL 10.71 3.00 1.54 2.38 9.79 
LOAL 10.71 3.00 .96 2.79 9.96 
MLL 12.50 3.00 1.91 4.36 9.23 
COML 10.71 3.00 2.47 3.14 8.10 
INL 10.71 3.00 1.52 .68 11.51 
OL 10.71 3.00 .003 .94 12.77 
CCB 3.0 o.oo o.oo o.oo 3.00 
XRES 3.0 o.oo o.oo o.oo 3.00 
ERES 10.32~/ o.oo o.oo o.oo 10.23 
PSR 10.32 o.oo o.oo o.oo 10.23 
ARC 10.32 o.oo o.oo o.oo 10.23 
Liabilities 
SD 9.50 1.00 10.50 
TD 13.50 .59 14.09 
STD 3.00 .25 3.25 
BGF 9.50 1.41 10.91 
BSF o.so .46 9.96 
SSDC o.o 1.27 1.27 
REDS LO .35 1.35 
REDO 3.oY 
.99 3.99 
IBRD 9.0 .58 9.58 
OBIL o.o 1.53 1.53 
OLIAB o.o .20 .20 
Source: Vergara 
~I See Table 1 for a definition of the variables. 
b/ Net return on asset equals (1 + 2) - (3 + 4) and total costs of liability 
- equals 1 + 3. 
c/ The computed average rate of return on securities is 9.875% per annum. 
- Since the return is tax-exempt and the average bank is at a 4.31% tax 
bracket, the before-tax return equals 10.34%. 
~I The rediscount interest rate on commercial and industrial papers is 4% per 
year. 
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The first version incorporated a parameterized increase of 50 percent over the 
original loan demands used in the basic model to deal with the uncertainties 
associated with the demand forecasts.~ The second version analyzed the 
impact of the suspension of special time deposits as a seed fund to support 
the supervised credit program of the rural banks. The third version examined 
how equalizing the interest rates on rediscount funds for supervised agri-
cultural loans and ordinary agricultural loans (1 percent and 3 percent, 
respectively) with that on commercial and industrial loans (4 percent), 
affected the allocation of funds among different types of loans. Due to the 
size and complexity of the model, Table 3 contains results only for selected 
variables pertinent to this study, and only year-end balances or total yearly 
results are included. In total, monthly and yearly results were included for 
65 variables [Vergara]. 
A gross profit of P422,220 was optimally obtained from the basic model. 
Adjusting this for the other operating expenses and other income throughout 
the programming periods resulted in actual net profit (P) of P213,177 (Table 
3). This represents the sum of all the period net profits and translates into 
an optimal return on equity (ROE) to stockholders of 16.68 percent. The 
actual ROE estimated for the previous year was 22 percent but unlike the 
model's ROE, actual report~d profit is not adjusted for default risk. 
The model solution values for the liquid asset varibles, i.e., cash on 
hand (COH), due from Central Bank (CCB), and due from other banks (COB), pro-
vide a good example of profit-motivated compositional shift in the balance 
sheet of the bank. Except for the first period when COB has a value of 
Pl4,795, the liquid assets of the bank are totally in the form of CCB. Under 
actual operating conditions, a certain amount of non-earning liquid assets, 
Table 3: Optimal Solution Values of the Structural Variables in the Basic Rural Bank 
LP Model and Three Alternative Versions, Central Luzon, Philippines, 1980. 
Version No. 1 Version No. 2 Version No. 3 
A 50% Increase Elimination of Special Equalization of Interest 
Variables.~/ Base Model in Loan Demand Time Deposit Seed Fund Rates on Rediscount Funds Period 12 Total Period 12 Total Period 12 Total Period 12 Total 
- - - - - - - - - - - p 000 - - - - - - - -
ICCB 217.4 
CCB 807.5 783.4 783.4 1,000.7 
COB 2,398.6 
SSLC 145.5 218.2 3,747.9 145.5 2,197.6 145.5 
SSL 1,919.7 2,694.1 1, 900.3 1,919.7 
SOLC 67.4 1, 180.7 101.1 1, 771.0 67.4 1,180. 7 67.4 1,180.7 
SOL 1,003.5 1,441.9 1,003. 5 1,003.5 
LSLC 196.1 3,436.6 294.2 5,154.9 196.1 3,4 36.6 196.1 3,436.6 
LSL 2,854.2 4,010.5 2,854.2 2, 854.2 
LOLC 128.9 2,259.1 193.4 3,388.7 128.9 2,259.1 128.9 2,259.1 
LOAL 2,065.1 2,925.7 2,065.1 2, 065.1 
MLLC 39.7 476.6 39.7 476.6 39.7 476.6 39.7 476.6 
MLL 847.2 847.2 847.2 847.2 
COMLC 81.5 978.6 81.5 978.6 81.5 978.6 81.5 978.6 
COML 608.5 608.5 607.1 608.5 
INLC 46.1 553.4 46.1 553.4 46.1 553.4 46.1 553.4 
INL 429.9 429.9 429.9 429.9 
OLC 29.5 345.9 29.5 345.9 29.5 345.9 29.5 345.9 
OL 242.1 242.1 242.1 242.1 
XRESC 111.9 43.4 69.3 
XRES 111.9 43.4 654.0 
ERES 56.5 56.5 56.5 56.5 
ARC 997.0 1,320.00 994.9 997 .o 
SDC 34.4 355.4 34.4 355.4 34.4 355.4 34.4 355.4 
SD 2,683.0 2,683.0 2,683.0 2,683.0 
TDC 74.7 512.4 74.7 512.4 74.7 512.4 74.7 512.4 
TD 1, 226.1 1,226.1 1, 226.1 1, 226.1 
Table 3 continued 
- ------------
Version No. I Version No. 2 · Version No. 3 
A 50% Increase Elimination of Special Equalization of Interest 
Variable~ 
Base Model in Loan Demand Time Deposit Seed Fund Rates on Rediscount Fund~ 
Period 12 Total Period 12 Total Period 12 Total Period 12 Total 
- - - - - - - - - - - p 000 - - - - - - - - - - -
BGFC 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
BGF 7.5 7.5 8.2 7.5 
BSF 78.8 78.8 78.8 78.8 
SSDC 157.1 235.7 157.1 157.1 
SREDSC 2,352.1 3, 5 27.6 2,052.1 2,143.3 
SREDS 1,316.5 1, 974.8 
LREDSC 3,240.5 4,860. 7 3,240.5 3,118.9 
LREDS 2,000.7 3,001.1 
SREDOC 425.7 1,046.6 511.9 
SREDO 135.4 611.1 
LREDOC 612.7 1,488.4 998.2 776.8 
LREDO 57.1 655.1 
CREDOC 167.9 260.9 256.7 260.9 
IREDOC 73.8 119.9 184.4 147.6 
IBRDC 35.3 423.7 35.3 423.7 35.3 423.7 35.3 423.7 
IBRD 569.0 569.0 569.0 569.0 
OLIABC 41.9 404.6 42.0 42.0 42.0 404.6 
OLIAB 1,025.5 1,0 25.5 1,025.5 1, 025.5 
UI 394.7 546.8 394.7 394.7 
APL 387.4 380.4 286.7 287.4 
p 16.6 213.1 37.3 363.8 15.7 178.6 15.4 157.7 
CAP 1,384.9 1,536.1 1,350.4 1,329.5 
Source: Vergara 
a/ See Appendix A for definition of variables. 
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COH and COB, are normally maintained. Thus, the non-risk adjusted ROE is 
expected to be higher than that obtained under actual conditions. 
Liquid assets remained relatively constant throughout the year at 
P783,374. This represents exactly 20 percent of the deposit liabilities with 
required reserves, i.e., savings deposits (SD), time deposits (TD), and demand 
deposits (DD). This percentage exactly matches the recommended primary 
reserves ratio of 20 percent which was imposed on the model. 
An optimal total year-end loan portfolio amounting to P9,970,253 was 
generated by the model {Table 3). This represents the sum of the 12th period 
solution values of the outstanding loan variables: SSL, SOL, LSL, LOAL, MLL, 
COML, INL, and OL. Short term agricultural loans, SSL, SOL, LSL, and LOAL 
account for 79 percent of the portfolio. Small farm loans, SSL and SOL, 
contributed 29 percent of the portfolio. 
New loans granted, SSLC, SOLC, LSLC, LOLC, MLLC, COMLC, INLC, and OLC, 
throughout the programming periods summed to Pll,729,642. This exceeds the 
total loan portfolio outstanding at the end of the final period since the 
latter is already net of matured loans that were repaid. More than 31 percent 
of the new loans granted are in small farm loans (SSLC and SOLC). For all 
loan classes, the levels of new loans are at the market limits. As long as 
the net revenue on loans is higher than the cost of funds rural banks will 
maximize their profits by granting loans up to the market limits as long as 
funds are not limiting. As the results indicate, funds availability, par-
ticularly the CB rediscount funds, are far from becoming effective constraints 
on lending. 
The outstanding year-end investment portfolio equalled Pl,061,622, inclu-
sive of the investment in preferred stock redemption of P8,110 which was 
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assumed constant during the programming periods. The increase in the invest-
ment portfolio originates solely from increases in the investments in Agrarian 
Reform Credits (ARC).~/ Starting with an initial level of only P383,711 
during the first period, this type of investment rose to P997,025 at the end 
of the final period. 
An optimal mix of current liabilities heavily concentrated in rediscount 
borrowings (P5,592,628 in rediscounted supervised agricultural loans and 
Pl,280,053 in rediscounted ordinary loans) was generated by the basic model. 
This fund accounts for almost 59 percent of the total loans granted throughout 
the 12 periods. There was a net increase of only P355,358 in savings deposits 
(SDC) which was almost exactly offset by a decrease in time deposits. New 
time deposits (TDC) totalled P512,386 but this was exceeded by the maturation 
of the old time deposits outstanding at the beginning of the first period. 
Since time deposits are the most expensive source of funds in the model and, 
except for other liabilities (OLIAB), rediscounting of supervised loans is the 
least expensive, these results were expected. These results suggest that 
rural banks cannot be expected to mobilize funds in rural areas as long as 
cheaper sources of funds are available from rediscount lines from the CB. 
Basic Model Version I: Increase in Loan Demand Forecast of 50 Percent 
In this version, it is assumed that excess demand may exist only in the 
case of short-term agricultural loans. Since an exact measure of the excess 
demand is not possible, the loan demand forecast used in the basic model was 
parameterized in 10 percent intervals to a maximum of 50 percent above the 
base loan demand. The optimal solution indicates that the net profit (P) 
increased to P363,800 with a SO percent increase in loan demand. Evidently, 
without the market restrictions on loan demand, the profit and ROE will 
18 
increase to an unrealistically high level that will be constrained only by the 
available funds. The bank's portfolio is specialized in loan types that have 
the highest net return which shows how the profit contribution of a cheap 
rediscounting policy is so directly linked to, and constrained by, the demand 
for loans. 
It is obvious that in the absence of market restrictions on loans, the 
rate of return a rural bank can obtain with rediscounting will only be 
constrained by the maximum limit on rediscounting. A profit-maximizing bank 
will arbitrage indefinitely, granting rediscountable loans, rediscounting 
them, and using the proceeds to make further loans until the limits on 
rediscount funds are reached. This, of course, assumes that the net return on 
rediscountable loans is invariant with the volume of loans supplied and that 
it is higher than the rate of discount. Since the nominal rate of return and 
the administrative costs are assumed constant, this is equivalent to assuming 
that the default risk on loans is also invariant with the supply of loans; 
however, a positive correlation exists between risk and the amount of loans. 
As the risk increases to the point where the estimated net return on 
rediscountable loans become equal to or less than the rate of discount, the 
optimal supply of rediscountable loans will be determined. Which of the 
alternati~e loan demand forecasts corresponds to this optimum is extremely 
difficult to determine. 
Version 2: 
to support 
To enable the banks to maximize their participation in the CB sponsored 
supervised credit program, the CB has also been providing the rural banks with 
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a seed fund in the form of a three month STD at an annual interest of 3 per-
cent. This seed fund is to augment the bank's own liquid funds at the start 
of the "season" of the program and thus enable it to accommodate as many 
borrowers as possible whose loans can be rediscounted later with the CB to 
accommodate future borrowers. 
Quite clearly, the overall profitability of rediscounting to the rural 
bank is limited by the amount of initial funds it has. In the extreme case 
where the initial fund is zero, the bank will gain nothing from rediscounting 
as it will not be able to genera~e new loans to rediscount later. 
The results from a model without the STD as a source of funds show that 
new loans granted during the first period suffered the most. Considering all 
the periods, however, the increase in new time deposits remains the same as in 
the original model. Also, the overall effect on the amount of funds allocated 
to ARC is only P2 thousand less in this model than in the basic model (Table 
3). Net profit (P) over the periods is reduced to Pl78,600. This net profit 
of the bank without STD is equivalent to a net return of only 12 percent and 
indicates that bank profits will suffer without STD. 
Model Version No. 3: Equalization of the interest rates on various 
rediscount funds 
Currently, on supervised agricultural loans, the interest rate on 
rediscount funds is set at 1 percent compared to 3 percent on ordinary agri-
cultural loans and 4 percent on commercial and industrial loans. The objec-
tive of interest rate differentiation is to increase the profitability of 
supervised agricultural loans relative to other loans and thus induce the 
rural banks to allocate more of their funds to supervised loans. However, as 
discussed earlier, as long as the costs of funds needed to finance the various 
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types of loans are less than the net rates of returns on loans, differences in 
the profitability of loans are irrelevant since availability of funds is not 
an effective constraint. Only the market constraints effectively limit the 
allocation of funds among the various types of loans. Further reduction in 
the costs of funds will have no effect on allocation of funds as long as the 
market constraints remain effective. Conversely, the costs of funds could be 
increased without affecting the allocation of funds among the various types of 
loans as long as they are below the net return on certain types of loans. 
As an empirical test of the above, the basic model was modified by 
equalizing the interest rates on rediscount funds with the rate on commercial 
and industrial loans as the basis. As expected, the allocation of funds among 
the different types of loans remains constant. Among the asset variables, 
only ARC and CCD were affected. The intertemporal allocation of funds to ARC 
changed for some periods but the overall amount of funds allocated did not 
change. There was, however, a reduction in the amount of liquid assets, CCBt, 
held by the bank. 
Among the liability items, only the rediscount funds were affected. 
There was a decrease in supervised rediscounting, i.e., SREDSCt and LREDSCt 
and an increase in ordinary rediscounting, i.e., LREDOCt, SREDOCt, CREDOCt 
and IREDOCt• Again this is consistent with profit-maximizing behavior since 
as their interest rates are equalized, the "price ratio" moves in favor of 
ordinary rediscounts. 
The equalization of discount rates resulted in a profit reduction to 
Pl57,500. In a counterfactual sense, the profit reduction from the base model 
to this model represents the amount by which profit would be increased through 
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a policy of preferential rediscount rates for agricultural loans. As evi-
denced by the result~, however, this policy could not be expected to lead to 
an increase in agricultural loans unless the demand for loans increases. 
Conclusions and Implications 
New policies are needed to increase the flow of credit to small farmers 
if the goal of a more balanced, stable, and equitable agricultural development 
is to be pursued. Private rural banks should continue to play a major role 
and hence, the need to foster the long-run stability and growth of the rural 
banking system cannot be over emphasized. In this respect, policies to pro-
mote the financial independence of rural banks from the Central Bank become 
very relevant. 
A policy suggested by this study is the suspension of special time depo-
sits as a seed fund for financing the supervised credit program. It should be 
obvious to the rural bank management that the profitability of rediscounting 
depends on the amount of the initial liquidity it can utilize to generate new 
rediscountable loans and thereby start the sequential process of rediscounting 
these loans, making further loans from rediscounting proceeds etc. This seed 
fund policy only serves as a disincentive to practice sound and efficient 
liquidity and liability management. More importantly, concessional 
discounting policies discourage banks from mobilizing local deposits. 
Unless there is a significant increase in loan demand in the future, any 
policy that seeks to shift the composition of the liabilities of the rural 
banks away from the cheap rediscount funds and STD from the CB toward more 
expensive deposit liabilities and capital funds can only be expected to lead 
to reduced profitability for rural banks. Considering the high rate of return 
that the rural banks expect, this policy may have serious repercussions on the 
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long-term growth and stability of the rural banking system. There is also the 
difficult issue concerning the availability of deposit liabilities. Even if a 
policy could be formulated that would increase the marginal return of addi-
tional deposits to the rural banks, the problem is that the rural banks may 
have very limited opportunities to raise additional deposits in view of the 
negative real rates of interest paid on them. The interest elasticity of the 
supply of deposits is still an empirical issue in The Philippines but based on 
experience in Taiwan and Korea, it can be postulated that an increase in 
interest rates would increase deposits [Adams]. However, changes in the 
interest rates on deposits cannnot be considered without at the same time 
dealing with the interest rate policies on loans. 
We suggest that increasing the flow of credit to the small farmers and 
promoting the financial independence of the rural banks can be achieved by 
nothing less than a comprehensive rural financial reform that will simulta-
neously consider policies concerning the costs of various sources of funds 
(the supply side) and the returns on the alternative uses of funds (the demand 
side). A single-policy piecemeal approach to financial reform will not likely 
be adequate and may only lead to unintended undesirable consequences. 
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Footnotes 
* The authors are Professor, a former graduate student, and Professor, 
respectively, in the Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, 
The Ohio State University. 
1/ The bank premises ratio and the furniture, fixture and equipment ratio 
were not included in the model. It was assumed that there will be no purchase 
and sale of these assets during the programming period. 
II The exchange rate in October of 1979 was about P9.50 per u.s. dollar. 
3/ The loan demand forecasts have been parameterized in such a way that 
it covers increases of 10%, 20%, 30%, 40% and 50% over the original. However, 
the solution values do not differ much between 10% and 40% and hence only the 
results for 50% are presented. 
4/ In The Philippines all banking institutions are required to maintain 
at least 25 percent of the loan portfolio in agricultural loans. At least ten 
of the 25 percent should be loans to small-farmer beneficiaries of the 
agrarian reform program. The banks are given the option to meet this require-
ment by purchasing ARC securities from the CB. 
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Appendix A: Definition of Selected Structural Variables 
in The Rural Bank LP Model, Central Luzon, Philippines, 
1979-1980 
CCBt 
DCCBt, ICCBt 
COBt 
SSLCt, SSLt 
SOLCt, SOLt 
LSLCt, LSLt 
LOLCt, LOALt 
MLLCt, MLLt 
COMLCt, COMLt 
INLCt, INLt 
OLCt, OLt 
XRESCt, XRESt 
ERESCt ERESt 
ARCCt, ARCt 
SDCt, SDt 
TDCt, TDt 
STDCt, STDt 
BGFCt, BGFt 
BSFCt, BSFt 
LREDSCt 
- due from Central Bank in period t 
- the decrease and the increase, respectively, in CCB 
- due from other banks in period t 
- (new) supervised small agricultural loans granted and 
outstanding, respectively 
- (new) small ordinary agricultural loans granted and 
outstanding, respectively 
- (new) large supervised agricultural loans granted and 
outstanding, respectively 
- (new) large ordinary agricultural loans granted and 
outstanding, respectively 
- (new) medium and long-term agricultural loans granted and 
outstanding, respectively 
- (new) commercial loans granted and outstanding, respectively 
- (new) industrial loans granted and outstanding, respectively 
- (new) other loans granted and outstanding, respectively 
- (new) non-reserve eligible securities purchased and 
outstanding, respectively 
- (new) reserve-eligible securities purchased and 
outstanding, respectively 
- (new) "agrarian reform credits" securities purchased and 
outstanding, respectively 
- (new) savings deposits and savings deposits outstanding, 
respectively 
- (new) time deposits and time deposits outstanding, respectively 
- (new) special time deposits and special time deposits 
outstanding, respectively 
- decrease in Barrio Guarantee Fund (BGF) and BGF 
outstanding, respectively 
- increase in Barrio Savings Fund (BSF) and BSF outstanding, 
respectively 
- special savings deposits outstanding 
SSLCt rediscounted in period t and become available in 
period t + 1 
LSLCt rediscounted in period t and become available in 
period t + 1 
SREDOCt, LREDOCt, CREDOCt, IREDOCt - SOLCt, LOLCt, COMLCt and INLCt 
rediscounted, respectively, in period t and become 
available in period t + 1 
SREDSt, LREDSt' SREDOt, CREDOt, IREDOt - the end-of-period balances of 
IBRDCt, IBRDt 
OLIABCt, OLIABt 
different types of rediscount borrowings (t = 2, ••••• , 12) 
- (new IBRD and IBRD outstanding, respectively 
- (new) other liabilities and other liabilities outstanding, 
respectively 
- unearned interest income for 
- allowance for probabe losses 
- net profit/income from loans 
- capital accounts outstanding 
each period 
for each period 
and investents for 
for each period 
each period 
